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High levels of sovereign debt have become a serious issue in the Eurozone. This 
does not just affect the individual member states: The European debt crisis has 
shown that difficulties in one euro-area country can spread to the entire currency  
union. What strategies are being discussed for reducing sovereign debt? Would a 
stronger role for the EU help to reduce debt over the long term or should this be  
left solely to the member states? 
Sovereign debt:  
Do we need  
an EU solution?
“Projects to enhance EU growth potential 
could be financed by joint debt issuances.” 
Pier Carlo Padoan, Italian Finance Minister
position paper by the Italian Ministry of Finance  
in February 2016
Why is sovereign debt a  
problem for the Eurozone?
No-bailout clause
The EU Treaties state that 
EU member states and the 
EU are not liable for the 
debt of other members. This 
clause is meant to ensure 
that national governments 
draw up their budgets so 
cautiously that they are 
never at risk of a sovereign 
debt crisis.
Emergency loans
Since 2010, the euro-area 
countries have used bailouts 
to provide loans to coun-
tries that are in principle  
solvent but under heavy 
pressure from capital mar-
kets. Today, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
is used primarily for this. 
The ESM is under the con-
trol of the euro-area coun-
tries and can provide up to 
500 billion euro in credit. 
Many members of the Eurozone 
are heavily indebted. This applies 
in particular to Greece, Italy and 
Portugal: The amount of sovereign 
debt has ex ceeded 130 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in these three 
countries. But even the average level 
of debt among euro-area countries 
amounts to 90 percent of GDP. This 
limits governments’ leeway since 
they must spend ever-larger amounts 
on interest payments and have fewer 
resources available to deal with  
unanticipated events such as an  
eco nomic crisis.
The Eurozone is prone to end up in 
a vicious circle of debt. Coun tries 
that issue sovereign debt in their own 
currency are relatively resistant to 
panics: If government bonds have no 
buyers for a short period during a 
crisis, the domestic central bank can 
provisionally hold them. But the 
situa tion is different in the Eurozone. 
The European Central Bank’s purchase 
of individual countries’ government 
bonds is controversial and permitted, 
at best, under very strict conditions. 
Thus, even Spain, which had a debt 
ratio of just 40 percent of GDP in 
2008, experienced payment difficul-
ties after the global financial crisis. 
When the government needed money 
to sta bilise the financial system, in-
terest rates on its bonds rose higher 
and higher, increasingly calling into 
ques tion the country’s ability to pay.
For a long time, the euro-area coun-
tries had no plan of action to meet a  
sovereign debt crisis. At its formation, 
the currency union was based on a 
 no-bailout clause. But when the 
Greek government ran into difficul-
ties with its finances in 2009, a panic 
broke out in the Eurozone. If a country 
went bankrupt, the fear was that in-
vestors would withdraw their money 
from other euro-area countries, ulti-
mately leading to departures from  
the Eurozone and a meltdown in the 
financial system. The euro-area coun -
tries decided to provide  emergency 
loans and, effectively, to bail each  
other out.
“Joint liability combined with far-reaching 
national sovereignty would be the false path. 
That would do more to increase the problems 
in Europe than to solve them.” 
Jens Weidmann, German Central Bank President
in Die Welt on 25 June 2017
“I personally consider eurobonds to be a possible 
instrument in order to finance future common tasks of 
the European Union at favourable conditions. However, 
they should not be used to shift debt that a state issued 
in the past onto the backs of other Europeans.”
Sylvie Goulard, Member of the European Parliament
in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung on 13 May 2017
“Macron also ultimately proposes to move 
towards harmonisation, and ultimately debt 
mutualisation. By contrast, I am in favour of 
finally adhering to the rules again.” 
Christian Lindner, Chairman of the FDP
in an interview with Politico on 21 June 2017
Balanced-budget rule
A law, often constitution-
ally anchored, that requires 
gov ernments to barely 
spend more than they 
receive in revenue. The 
permitted deficit for most 
euro-area countries is 
- 0.5 percent of GDP. In 
recessions, some what 
more may be spent, while 
in periods of high economic 
growth less. 
Stability and  
Growth Pact
A package of European 
rules designed to reduce 
Eurozone members’ 
sovereign debt to below 
60 percent of GDP over 
the medium term. Among 
other things, it limits budget 
deficits in Eurozone coun-
tries to a yearly maxi mum 
of three percent of GDP. 
The European Commission 
monitors compliance with 
the pact and can impose 
fines in the event of any 
breaches. 
How can Europe  
reduce its debt? 
All euro-area countries want to re-
duce their sovereign debt, but there 
is no agreement on the best strategy. 
The Eurozone has three courses 
towards reducing debt ratios: Govern-
ments can cut spending, they can 
stimulate growth, or they can seek  
a haircut.
In the first phase of the euro cri-
sis, austerity policies dominated. 
Member countries only obtained 
emergency loans in return for harsh 
cuts in public spending. The Fiscal 
Compact also introduced mandatory 
 balanced-budget rules into national 
law, and the European Commission 
can impose sanctions more easily 
since 2011 if countries violate the 
 Stability and Growth Pact. Critics, 
however, point out that austerity 
policies in an economic crisis deepen 
the downturn and thus reduce the 
affected country’s solvency.
The larger a country’s economy, 
the lower its relative debt burden. 
Growth plays a key role therefore.  
If Greece, for example, were to take 
on no new debt and grow annually  
at three percent, it would cut its debt  
to GDP ratio in half by 2030. 
But the correct path towards growth 
is controversial: While countries 
such as Italy and Greece call for 
governments to stimulate growth 
through higher spending, Germany 
and other countries demand an im-
provement in the overall economic 
framework.
Reducing debt via a haircut was ap-
plied in the case of Greece in 2012. 
This cannot be easily repeated for 
multiple reasons, however. Negotia- 
tions with creditors are very com-
plicated and slow. Furthermore, 
banks often hold their own country’s 
gov ernment bonds so the financial 
system may collapse in the event of 
a sovereign default. If other euro-area 
countries are rather the primary 
creditors, a haircut would hurt their 
national budgets and conflict with 
the no-bailout clause. 
SCENARIO 1
Growth and limited risk sharing
If euro-area countries cannot agree on a common approach, they 
have to manage their sovereign debt within the scope of the rules 
already in place. National governments by and large decide on 
their debt-reduction strategy by themselves. However, they cannot 
implement large debt-financed economic programmes since the 
European Commission monitors compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Minor violations are often tolerated in practice.
In this scenario, some countries succeed in stimulating economic 
growth through reforms and a redirection in government spending, 
while other countries in the currency union have to combat a stag-
nating economy and ever-higher government debt.
If the debt in a country gets out of control, the European Stability 
Mechanism intervenes with emergency loans. It remains unclear, 
however, whether it can act quickly enough to stop a crisis at its 
inception and has enough resources available to stabilise large 
member states as well.
SCENARIO 2
Insolvency regime and haircuts
In this scenario, the euro-area countries adhere to the original 
principle of denying any common liability for sovereign debt. There 
are no longer loans for countries caught in an emergency. Instead, 
a sort of insolvency regime is introduced for states, allowing for an 
orderly haircut inside the currency union. For the financial system  
to handle such a shock, banks may no longer treat government bonds 
as risk-free as they do today. Instead, they must build provisions  
in case the bonds lose their value.
Consequently, there are no disputes about austerity conditions 
imposed by the European Commission since national governments 
are given autonomous control of their budgetary policy. Depositors, 
banks, insurance companies and other capital-market participants 
differentiate between more and less solvent countries when buying 
government bonds and thereby reward the effort to lower debt.
At the same time, Eurozone member states would remain susceptible 
to market panics and speculative attacks as seen during the euro 
crisis. Countries that have high sovereign-debt levels would also 
have to pay significantly higher interest on their government bonds, 
which would make an insolvency regime politically unlikely.
SCENARIO 3
Common guarantees and control
In this third scenario, the euro-area countries decide in favour of a 
fiscal union, that is for a large-scale sharing of risk and sovereignty. 
Sovereign debt is guaranteed collectively. This entails extensive 
monitoring of national budgets by the European Commission so that 
countries cannot issue limitless debt.
This model offers maximum protection against speculative attacks 
in the Eurozone. It creates common safe bonds that banks use as a 
capital buffer and can be purchased by the ECB in any acute crisis. 
Countries with little or no debt would likely have to spend more 
money on interest payments than before, while heavily indebted 
countries would have to pay less.
These common guarantees and controls would substantially limit 
the sovereignty of euro-area countries, however, which only a few  
seem to be willing to accept today. Furthermore, moving to a fiscal 
union does not answer the fundamental question of whether econo-
mic crises should be met by increasing spending or adopting austerity 
measures.
A fiscal union is also conceivable in a milder form: For example, 
common debt and extensive European supervision could be used 
only in times of crisis. An alternative would be that the debt of a 
country could only be jointly guaranteed up to a maximum level,  
for example 60 percent of GDP. All other debt would be guaranteed  
by the issuing country alone and could at a pinch be restructured.
“The various proposals do not have to be mutually exclusive; they can often be 
combined in a fruitful way. The Eurozone needs more growth and more explicit 
sharing of risk so that it can act credibly in the next crisis. Against the backdrop 
of such a stable system, an insolvency regime for states could work.”
Jörg Haas
The author is a Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin.
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Measure Content
Stability and  
Growth Pact
Upper limit for sovereign-debt ratio and budget 
deficits, which are monitored by the European 
Commission
Fiscal Compact
Eurozone countries must adopt national laws that 
automatically limit new debt
Insolvency regime  
for states
Simplifies a debt restructuring; creditors must ac-
cept losses on bonds from over-indebted countries
Accountability Bonds
New debt that is not in conformity with EU rules, 
enjoys fewer guarantees and can be restructured 
more easily
Debt redemption fund
Legacy debt is guaranteed collectively, which 
reduces the interest payments of heavily indebted 
countries
Blue bonds & red bonds
Common guarantees for a portion of the sovereign 
debt; debt in addition to this is restructured in the 
case of a debt crisis
Eurobonds
New debt is jointly guaranteed by Eurozone mem-
bers in order to facilitate the servicing of debt and  
to stop a self-reinforcing debt crisis
Under 
discussion
Existing
In the course of the crisis, the level of sovereign debt increased greatly in the Eurozone.  
Affected in particular were states such as Greece and Portugal, which already had high levels  
of debt prior to the crisis. However, the crisis also impacted countries such as Spain and Ireland, 
which were hardly indebted beforehand, but paid large amounts for the stabilisation of their 
financial systems.
Source: Eurostat 2017.
The degree to which a country is affected by its debt depends largely on economic growth. 
Even a very heavily-indebted country such as Greece would achieve a debt ratio of 60 percent 
of GDP in 21 years, that is the level allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact, if the economy 
grew three percent per year. If the economy expanded by only one percent, this would take 
fifteen years longer. The model calculation assumes for the period after 2017 that the ECB 
achieves its price stability goal of two percent inflation per year and the absolute level of debt 
remains unchanged.
Source: Eurostat 2017, author’s calculations.
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In the publication series “Europa briefing”, the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
and the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin cover key topics of European 
politics and present possible scenarios: What is the problem?  
What might happen next? And what can politics do now? 
You will find all the publications from the joint project here:  
www.strengthentheeuro.eu 
